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Abstract
Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated
firms. We study how business groups can substitute some functions of
missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. In a two period
model, there is no contract enforcement in the first period. The firms within
the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production
structure, resulting in externalities due to double marginalization, and an
internal capital market. Our model derives the sequencing of investments
and the credit contract offered by the headquarters that solve the ex post
moral hazard problem. Thus, the business group’s organizational mode and
the financial structure facilitate relational contracting.
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1. Introduction
In his famous essay, Gerschenkron (1962) argues that in relatively backward coun-
tries the productive and organizational structures differ from those used in estab-
lished industrial countries. One of these organizational structures that dominate
many emerging markets are business groups, which are a “[...] collection of firms
bound together in some formal and/ or informal ways.” (Granovetter, 1994, p.
454). There is widespread evidence that business groups perform better than
unaffiliated firms. When explaining the success of business groups in emerging
markets, one must consider that they operate under conditions that differ funda-
mentally from those in established market economies. First, the outside institu-
tions, such as law enforcement, are much less sophisticated. This constitutes a
major impediment for financial transactions and debt financing. Second, many
producers possess market power in their industries. It has been conjectured that
business groups are substitutes for missing institutions and therefore perform bet-
ter than unaffiliated firms (Khanna, 2000). We provide a theoretical explanation
of how business groups act as substitutes for contract enforcement. We argue in
our theoretical model that the organizational mode and the financial structure of
a business group facilitate relational contracting.
We set up a two-period model in order to study the features of a relational
contract. In the first period, institutions are deficient because there is no contract
enforcement by a court. In the case of debt financing an ex post moral hazard
problem exists; this has to be solved by a self-enforcing contract. However, in
the second period, the legal institutions have improved and therefore contracts
are enforceable by a court. The major players are a manufacturer, a retailer,
and the investors. They have the option of forming a business group with an
internal capital market. The characteristic feature of the business group is a
headquarters that exerts common financial control. On the production side, the
firms are linked by a vertical production structure and they are all monopolists
in their markets. In the case of non-integration, this organizational structure
creates externalities through double marginalization, resulting in production and
investment levels that are lower than socially desirable. On the financial side,
they are connected through the internal capital market. Therefore, an additional
externality arises. Consider a firm that receives credit from the headquarters in
the first period for a cost-cutting investment. If this firm defaults, investment in
the second period by another firm of this vertical production chain will not be
financed. This means that the defaulting firm does not enjoy a higher profit in
the second period because the cost-cutting investment in the second period is not
made. The contribution of our paper is to explain why it can be efficient to not
integrate. We show that relying on the externalities present in a business groups
allows us to design a relational contract that solves the ex post moral hazard
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problem of finance. Thus, a business group allows credit financing in the first
period which would fail otherwise due to the missing contract enforcement.
Russia provides an example for how difficult contract enforcement can be. Ar-
bitrage courts, which are public courts dealing with economic issues, are inept
at enforcing contracts. As a result, it takes a long time until a verdict is made.
Moreover, there are substantial costs of going to court (Greif and Kandel, 1995,
p. 312). After a verdict is made, the seizure of assets through the bailiff service
can take an additional several months (Kahn, 2002).1 Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that many Russian firms do not rely on public contract enforcement; among
269 firms interviewed only 55.5 per cent said that courts can enforce contracts
(Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). Relational contracts have evolved to
circumvent the legal system. The formation of Financial-Industrial Groups is one
example.
Numerous empirical studies demonstrate the superior performance of busi-
ness groups, such as Financial-Industrial Groups, compared to unaffiliated firms
in emerging markets (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1999, Perotti and Gelfer, 2001,
Recanatini and Ryterman, 2000). In his survey, Khanna (2000) suggests four
different sources that improve group performance. First, pyramidale ownership
1Kahn (2002) argues that the bailiff’s incentives for addressing cases with a substantial value
of a claim are destroyed by the wage structure. Moreover, bailiffs are only poorly supervised
and their endowment, e.g. with telephones and computers, is insufficient.
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structures might be used to expropriate minority shareholders. Second, groups
engage in rent-seeking and in times of financial distress receive government as-
sistance because they are perceived as “too big to fail”. Third, these groups can
exert market power. Fourth and most importantly, business groups can enhance
efficiency by alleviating market imperfections.2 In emerging markets, internal
product, labor and capital markets can foster efficiency since outside markets
function imperfectly.3
There are several papers analyzing theoretically the effects of internal capital
markets. Some of them emphasize the positive aspects of internal capital mar-
kets. For example, headquarters optimizes the allocation of funds by reallocating
cash flow across divisions (Stein, 1997). However, this “winner-picking” policy
also has a dark side. The ex ante incentive of a divisional manager may suffer if
he anticipates that cash flow generated in this division will be reallocated by the
headquarters (Brusco and Panunzi, 2002). Moreover, power struggles and lob-
bying are value-destroying effects of internal capital markets. As Khanna (2000)
suggests, institutional imperfections play an important role in emerging markets.
Therefore, the results from the theoretical literature on internal capital markets
cannot easily be transferred to study business groups in emerging markets.
2Pyle (2002) shows that the lack of contract enforcement together with missing credit registers
reduces the scale of commercial lending.
3Therefore, an important conclusion of the survey is: “It is perhaps sensible to see groups
acting as substitutes for missing institutions, which would normally facilitate the functioning of
markets, in the economy (...).” (Khanna, 2000, p. 754)
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Kali (1999, 2002) studies the interdependence of business groups and insti-
tutions. In a general equilibrium model, he analyzes how business networks can
substitute functioning institutions. This model shows that the network absorbs
honest agents and thereby has a negative impact on the anonymous market where
transactions are insufficiently protected by legal institutions (Kali, 1999). Kali
(2002) shows the transition from relational contracting to arms-length explicit
contracting that takes place when market intermediaries and institutions develop.
In his model, business groups are used for relational contracting. The result here is
that during the transition period, when institutions work imperfectly, both modes
of contracting complement each other (Kali, 2002).
The model closest to our analysis is that by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
They study the ex post moral hazard problem of financing if it is impossible to
enforce a debt contract that is contingent on profit. In a two-period setting, the
investor will refinance the firm in the second period only if the firm repaid its loan
in the first period. This repayment has to be high enough to cover the investor’s
expected loss from financing in the second period.
Like Bolton and Scharfstein, we focus on problems of contract enforcement.
Therefore, we do not factor in problems of asymmetric information between cred-
itor and debtor. Our analysis deviates from the Bolton-Scharfstein model by
incorporating several firms. We derive the organizational structure and the terms
5
of the credit contract that constitute a relational contract. In this theoretical
framework, we point out the advantage of an internal capital market in an econ-
omy with imperfect institutions. We find that business groups are substitutes for
missing institutions. Thus, we contribute a theoretical argument that explains
the superior performance of business groups in emerging markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model of ex post moral
hazard is presented. There we characterize the organizational structure, the tim-
ing of investment and the terms of the credit contract. The welfare implications of
the results as well as the incentive to integrate are discussed in section 3. Section
4 concludes.
2. A Model of Ex Post Moral Hazard
2.1. Model
Our model captures two periods. In the first period, the institutions are still im-
perfect. For the investor, this means that repayment cannot be enforced by going
to a court. In the second period, the institutions have improved and contracts are
enforceable by court. This is common knowledge.. Consequently, the problem of
ex post moral hazard disappears.4
4The evidence from transition countries shows that after 13 years of transition, the “law on
the books” developed much faster than law enforcement (EBRD, 2001). Thus, the improvement
of the institutional environment can be seen as a gradual development. In a n-period framework,
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We consider a model with a chain of monopolies. The monopolistic firms
capture the imperfect competitive environment in emerging markets.5 The chain
of monopolies reflects the externalities between producers in a business group.
The monopolistic producer of the intermediate good is called manufacturer M .
M produces an intermediate good at constant marginal costs of c. The retailer R,
who is also a monopoly, then faces a marginal cost for its input (the intermediate
good) of pM . For selling one unit of the intermediate good, the retailer incurs
constant marginal costs of k, e.g. for servicing customers. The retailer sets a
price p. The final-demand function is D (p) = 1 − p. It is straightforward to
show that the manufacturer produces q = 1−c−k
4
units of the intermediate good
which is sold to the retailer at a price of pM =
1+c−k
2
. Thus, the manufacturer’s
profit is ΠM = (1−c−k)
2
8
. The retailer sells these goods at a price of p = 3+c+k
4
and
gets a profit of ΠR = (1−c−k)
2
16
(Tirole, 2000). In this standard model of a vertical
structure, double marginalization is responsible for a production level that is too
low from a social welfare perspective.
Both firms can invest in order to reduce their costs which, in turn, increases
the quantity supplied in equilibrium. If the manufacturer invests IM , its costs
decrease from cH to cL. The retailer achieves a cost cut from kH to kL if he
contract enforcement has to work only in the last period.
5In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union the transition to a market economy started
a decade ago. Therefore, the market structure is in many respects still determined by central
planning. Consequently, many large industrial enterprises remain monopolies in their respective
industries (for Russia see Greif and Kandel, 1995, p. 312, and Broadman, 2001).
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invests IR. We assume that carrying out the investment is efficient in the sense
that the sum of profits generated by both firms in both periods exceeds the costs
of investment. Furthermore, we assume that cH + kH ≤ 1.
M and R, together with other firms some of which have excess funds, decide
to form a business group. The crucial feature of this business group is that it
has a common headquarters H that makes financial decisions. H collects excess
funds and grants credit to firms within the business group that need financing.
H can commit to financing even if the repayment does not cover the amount of
credit granted. However, H also faces a zero-profit constraint in the long run.
Thus, H establishes central financial control. Information between the members
of the business group is assumed to be symmetric because they have had previous
interaction.6 There is no financing from outside investors due to enormous infor-
mational asymmetries. Since neither M nor R get credit from outside banks, H
has a monopoly in financing them.
2.2. Ex Post Moral Hazard and Market Failure
The moral hazard problem cannot be solved in a one period framework. Suppose
that H grants credit in the amount of IM to M . M would always be better off
by defaulting. As the bank anticipates this opportunistic behavior it would not
6In our model, the agent exerting common financial control is called headquarters. It could
also be a common bank that finances all investment projects of the group. Further interpreta-
tions and applications are found in the Conclusion.
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grant credit at all. Thus, no investment would be made (Bolton and Scharfstein,
1990). This result implies that it is also impossible to finance both investments
IM and IR in the first period when the institutions are still imperfect.
Next, we show that credit will only be granted if a relational contract can be
designed. In our case, a relational contract is self-enforcing if the timing of the
investment decisions is chosen appropriately. From the result above, it is evident
that the investment projects have to be financed subsequently. First, we study the
case where investment in the first period is undertaken by M and in the second
period by R. Second, we study the case where investment is undertaken by R in
the first period and by M in the second period.
2.3. Case 1: M Invests in the First Period
The time structure of this model that features two periods of production is as
follows: Before the financial decisions are made, M , R and the other firms decide
about forming a business group. First, M makes a credit proposal that can be
accepted or rejected by H. In the first period, M invests if he is awarded the
funds. Then he decides on the price for the intermediate good. Based on that,
R determines its price. The prices determine the production level. At the end of
period 1, M either repays H or defaults, depending on which action maximizes
profit. AfterM ’s action, H can decide about financing R. In the second period, R
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invests. Both firms M and R set second-period prices and make their production
decisions. The time structure is illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
We assume that the additional profit for R generated through IR in the second
period is lower than the investment needed, i.e. 1
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cL − kH)
2
)
< IR. Therefore, R would not self-finance the investment. However, it is assumed
that the investment increases the profits generated for M and R by more than
IR, i.e. 3
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cL − kH)
2
)
> IR. Moreover, M ’s investment
increases the net profits of M and R in both periods as we assume that
3
8
(
(1− cL − kH)
2
− (1− cH − kH)
2
)
> IM . We assume that firms are not able to
finance the investment IR through their profits generated in the first period, i.e.
3(1−cL−kH)
2
16
< IR. To simplify the analysis, there is no discounting.
The following proposition describes the credit contract offered, i.e. the repay-
ment in period 1, denoted by Z1M , and in period 2, denoted by Z2R.
Proposition 1. In case 1, the headquarters H offers credit if the repayment in
period 1 is Z1M ≥ IR + IM + (1−cL−kH)
2
16
−
(1−cL−kL)
2
16
. In period 2, it demands as
repayment Z2R = (1−cL−kL)
2
16
−
(1−cL−kH)
2
16
.
Proof:
Provided that M has cut its costs to cL, R invests in the second period only
if he is not worse off than without a credit financed investment. Formally, his
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participation constraint is
(1− cL − kL)
2
16
− Z2R ≥
(1− cL − kH)
2
16
. (PC-R)
H will increase Z2R so that R’s participation constraint binds.7 H offers credit if
it obtains a non-negative payoff from this two-period relationship with M and R.
After inserting the optimal Z2R, the headquarter’s zero-profit constraint can be
written as
Z1M +
(1− cL − kL)
2
16
−
(1− cL − kH)
2
16
− IR − IM ≥ 0 (PC-B)
Solving for the first period repayment Z1M ≥ IR + IM + (1−cL−kH)
2
16
−
(1−cL−kL)
2
16
is determined. Q.E.D.
We assumed thatR would never use equity to finance its investment IR because
the profit generated is too low.8 However, the investment is socially desirable due
to the strong externality that IR has on M . In the second period, the repayment
Z2R that H demands can be no more than what investment IR adds to the profit
of R. Otherwise, it would hurt the firm’s participation constraint. H extracts the
7In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) only a proportion of the profit is verifiable. In contrast, in
our analysis, the increase in profit in the second period is contractible as institutions function
perfectly. However, the results generated in our model would still be obtained if only a proportion
of the profit is contractible.
8This is also the reason why R does not contribute its profit generated in period 1 to reduce
the amount of credit needed in period 2.
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additional profit because it exerts its monopoly power. However, this repayment
does not cover investment IR; H makes an expected loss. H grants credit only
if the loss in the second period is covered by the repayment from M in the first
period. Thus,M has to subsidizeR’s investment in the second period. Proposition
2 shows when this contract is feasible.
Proposition 2. In case 1, forming a business group solves the ex post moral
hazard problem if 3
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cL − kH)
2
)
≥ IR + IM and
1
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2 + (1− cL − kH)
2
)
≥ IR + IM .
Proof:
ForM , it has to be optimal to repay after period 1. Formally, this is expressed
in its incentive compatibility constraint:
(1− cL − kL)
2
8
− Z1M ≥
(1− cL − kH)
2
8
or (IC-M)
3
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cL − kH)
2
)
≥ IR + IM .
M ’s incentive compatibility constraint also guarantees that he demands credit to
finance the investment in period 1, i.e. that (1−cL−kH)
2
8
+ (1−cL−kL)
2
8
− Z1M ≥ 0.
Moreover, the profit generated in period 1 has to be high enough to cover the
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repayment Z1. The liquidity constraint is given by:
(1− cL − kH)
2
8
− Z1M ≥ 0 or (LC-M)
1
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2 + (1− cL − kH)
2
)
≥ IR + IM .
Q.E.D.
The driving forces for this solution are the two externalities generated in this
model. First, due to the vertical structure, R’s investment has a positive effect
on M ’s profit. As IR decreases R’s costs to kL, the quantity sold increases and,
consequently, the profits of both R and M increase. Second, default by M has a
negative externality onR. IfM does not repay,H does not grant credit to R in the
second period because it would make an expected loss. Accordingly,M anticipates
that his default prevents R from investing in a cost-cutting technology, and that
he loses the potential increase of his own profit ΠM . For the conditions given in
Proposition 2, it is optimal for M to repay. If (1− cL − kL)
2
> 2 (1− cL − kH)
2
,
the incentive compatibility constraint ofM always holds if its liquidity constraint
is fulfilled. For this parameter constellation, R’s cost reduction has the addi-
tional effect of reducing M ’s incentive to default because he would not enjoy an
increasing profit in the second period.
13
2.4. Case 2: R Invests in the First Period
Next, we study the reversed timing of investments. In this scenario, R invests in
the first period andM in the second. All other actions remain the same as before.
(Figure 2 illustrates the timing of events.)
In this case, we assume that the additional profit generated byM is too low to
cover the costs of investment IM , i.e. 1
8
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cH − kL)
2
)
< IM .
Still, both investments increase the profits forM andR in an amount that is higher
than the costs of investment, i.e. 3
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cH − kL)
2
)
> IM and
3
8
(
(1− cH − kL)
2
− (1− cH − kH)
2
)
> IR. Moreover, we assume that the firms
do not have enough liquid means to finance IM themselves in the second period,
i.e. 3
16
(1− cH − kL)
2
< IM .
The third proposition describes the credit contract offered by H.
Proposition 3. In case 2, H grants credit only if the repayment in period 1 is
Z1R ≥ IR + IM + (1−cH−kL)
2
8
−
(1−cL−kL)
2
8
. In period 2, it demands as repayment
Z2M = (1−cL−kL)
2
8
−
(1−cH−kL)
2
8
.
Proof:
The terms of the credit contract are determined analogously to case 1.
In period 2, M ’s investment is insufficient to cover the costs of investment.
Therefore, M would not self-finance the investment project. The loss that H
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makes with this investment has to be covered by R’s first period repayment.
Proposition 4 determines the parameter values for which offering this contract
solves the ex post moral hazard problem.
Proposition 4. In case 2, forming a business group solves the ex post moral
hazard problem if 3
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cH − kL)
2
)
≥ IR + IM and
1
16
(
2 (1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cH − kL)
2
)
≥ IR + IM .
Proof:
The repayment must fulfill R’s incentive compatibility constraint and its liq-
uidity constraint. Repayment Z1R is incentive compatible if
(1− cL − kL)
2
16
− Z1R ≥
(1− cH − kL)
2
16
or (IC-R)
3
16
(
(1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cH − kL)
2
)
≥ IR + IM .
This condition guarantees that R prefers the credit financed investment to the
outside option of no investment. In either period, credit financing is associated
with a profit of (1−cH−kH)
2
16
. Moreover, R’s first period profit has to be high enough
to cover the repayment Z1R. Formally, R’s liquidity constraint is given by:
(1− cH − kL)
2
16
− Z1R ≥ 0 or (LC-R)
1
16
(
2 (1− cL − kL)
2
− (1− cH − kL)
2
)
≥ IR + IM .
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Q.E.D.
As before, the interaction of the two externalities can be exploited by H to
design a self-enforcing contract. R’s decision to repay influences M ’s opportunity
to invest, and therefore increases its own profit because M ’s investment increases
ΠR too.9
Comparing the results in Proposition 2 and 4 shows that the cost reduction in
the second period plays a crucial role. In case 1, M has an incentive to repay if
the cost reduction by the second period investment IR exceeds the crucial value
described in Proposition 2. In contrast, in case 2, the cost reduction by IM has
to be high enough to give R an incentive to repay. In general, the larger the cut
in costs in period 2, the higher is the externality that increases the second-period
profit of the firm investing in period 1. Hence, the incentive to repay in period 1
increases.
3. Discussion of Results
3.1. Welfare Implications
The arguments above have shown that the type of contract, especially the se-
quencing of investment, depends crucially on the characteristics of the projects,
9If the cost-cutting effect of M ’s investment is such that (1− cL − kL)
2
> 2 (1− cH − kL)
2
,
R’s incentive compatibility constraint always holds, provided that R’s liquidity constraint is
fulfilled.
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as described by the parameter constellations. When designing a contract, three
restrictions have to be considered. First, profit generated in both firms in the first
period must not exceed the investment expenses in the second period. Otherwise,
the firms could join forces and self-finance the second-period investment. Under
these circumstances, the firm investing in the first period would no longer have
an incentive to repay. Hence, no credit would be granted in the first period.10
Second, the profit generated in the firm which invests in the first period has
to be high enough to cover the repayment that H needs to break even. This
repayment always includes a transfer that the bank needs in order to cover the
expected loss in the second period. This transfer can be interpreted as a subsidy
for the firm investing in the second period. The more the profit of the firm
investing in the second period increases by second period investment, the lower
the subsidy needs to be.
Third, the firm investing in the first period must have an incentive to repay.
Generally, this firm decides either to repay and to subsidize the firm investing in
the second period, or to default. The incentive compatibility constraint, which
guarantees that the firm investing in the first period repays its loan, is fulfilled
more easily if the cost-cutting effect of the second period investment is higher
10Whether there would be financing in the second period depends on the payoffs of the projects
compared to the investment needed. Without credit financing in the first period, profits in the
second period should be lower as there was no cost cutting investment.
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than the one in the first period. This implies that the externality from the second
period investment is higher. Therefore, investment made in the second period
increases the profit of the firm that has invested in the first period more strongly.
Moreover, the profit of the firm that invests in the second period is higher and
therefore the subsidy needed is lower. This renders the liquidity constraint of the
firm investing in the first period less demanding too.
These arguments already show a potential tension in the sequencing of invest-
ments. Basically, the sum of profits of the firms in the business group is influenced
by two factors: the amount of cost-reduction reached in the first as well as in the
second period, and the possibility to invest at all in the first period as the ex post
moral hazard problem has to be solved.
If contract enforcement is possible but there are not enough funds to finance
both investments simultaneously, the business group would undertake the invest-
ment that reaches a higher cost reduction in the first period. However, solving the
ex post moral hazard problem may require postponing the investment which re-
duces costs more strongly to the second period, as the discussion above has shown.
Facilitating investment in the first period is the dominant requirement since cost
reduction in the first period cannot otherwise be obtained. These countervailing
effects also highlight the inefficiency that arises if relational contracts have to be
used as explicit contracts are not enforceable in this framework.
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3.2. Incentive to Integrate
Naturally, the question arises why firms within the business group do not inte-
grate in order to reduce double marginalization and, thus, increase profit. The
theoretical analysis of the non-integrated business group has shown that the ex-
ternality that investment ofM has on R (and vice versa) provides an incentive for
M to repay. In an integrated structure, these externalities would disappear, and
with it, M ’s incentive to repay. A relational contract solving the ex post moral
hazard problem would not be feasible in such an organizational setting. On the
other hand, vertical integration would increase the group’s output and thus profit
to (1−c−k)
2
4
. Depending on the parameter constellations, it could be optimal to
remain un-integrated in order to design a relational contract solving the ex post
moral hazard problem. The benefit of facilitating cost cutting investments comes
at the cost of a lower level of production in the second period.
The following example shows a case in which firms do not have an incentive
to integrate because the profit of the business group, denoted by ΠBG, is higher
than the profit of an integrated firm, denoted by ΠI.
Example 1. Suppose that IM = 0.001, cH = 0.5, cL = 0.18 and I
R = 0.0192, kL =
0.27, kH = 0.5. In this case the profit of a business group are higher than the one
of an integrated firm, i.e. ΠBG = 0.05719 > ΠI = 0.055425.
The parameters are such that financing M in the first and R in the second
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period is self-enforcing. With the relational contract, the total profit in both
periods is ΠBG = 0.05719. The amount of goods produced is qBG1 = 0.08 in the
first period and qBG1 = 0.125 in the second period. An integrated firm does not
produce at all in the first period, but produces qI1 = 0.18 in the second period.
The total profit of an integrated firm amounts to ΠI = 0.055425.
For this example, the problem of poor institutions become evident at once.
Due to missing contract enforcement, outside creditors are unwilling to lend in
the first period. The (social) costs of credit rationing can be substantial. In
our example, only a very small amount of credit is needed in order to reduce
manufacturing costs dramatically. This cost reduction leads to an increase in
the amount of goods produced. Integration destroys the possibility of designing
self-enforcing contracts because it eliminates the externalities between M and R.
Consequently, an integrated firm is not able to finance a cost saving investment
by M in the first period. It can reap the benefits of lower manufacturing costs
only in the second period.
4. Conclusion
We started this paper with the question of how business groups can substitute im-
perfect institutions, especially the impossibility of enforcing contracts. The model
shows how a relational contract solves ex post moral hazard. The analysis reveals
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that vertically related firms do not integrate but establish common financial con-
trol in the form of an internal capital market. The first result of our analysis is
that firms in a business group can invest already in the first period when unaffili-
ated firms are credit rationed because of deficient institutions. The second result
is that funds are reallocated within the business group. The reallocation is due to
the externalities of the vertical structure which are thereby partially internalized.
In emerging markets, it can take much more than one period until contracts
are enforced. However, if the relational contracts are repeated within this vertical
structure until institutions that facilitate contract enforcement are in place, the
moral hazard problem can be solved in several periods. Due to this argument, the
positive effect of internal capital markets should increase compared to its negative
effect, the lower production.11
The design of a relational contract that we have derived theoretically in the
context of a business group should have further applications. Think about the
organizations that provide micro-credit to entrepreneurs in developing and also
transition countries (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000). In these coun-
tries, the institutions that allow contracts to be enforced are not in place. One
prominent solution is a structure which, for example, Grameen Bank possesses
11However, while contracts can sustain financial transactions between firms that know each
other, they do not help to develop new interactions (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).
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where credit is granted with joint liability (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).12 An-
other mechanism could be to exploit the market imperfections in the goods market
which create vertical externalities like in our model. As long as there is the possi-
bility to solve the ex post moral hazard problem for the firm that receives credit
in the last period, e.g. by collateralization, the mechanism suggested in our paper
should help to overcome credit rationing that is caused by poor institutions.
12An alternative solution is the exchange of information about firms through trade associations
or informal business networks (Pyle, 2003).
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Figure 2: Time structure
